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Paper 1999/006
Fast Proof of Plaintext-Knowledge and Deniable Authentication Based on Chinese Remainder Theorem
Roger Fischlin
Abstract
We propose a fast and communication-efficient proof of plaintext-knowledge (PPTK) protocol based on the Chinese Remainder theorem. With a PPTK the receiver of a ciphertext verifies that the sender knows the corresponding cleartext in such a way that a dishonest sender or an eavesdropper does not learn anything about the plaintext except with sub-polynomial probability. We turn any semantically secure public key cryptosystem into an efficient (interactive) one which is immune against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks by adding the PPTK protocol. Using our PPTK protocol we also derive an efficient protocol for deniable authentication.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- -- withdrawn --
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Appeared in the THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY LIBRARY and has been included in the ePrint Archive.
- Keywords
- Chinese Remainder TheoremChosen Ciphertext AttacksDeniable AuthenticationNon-Malleable CryptographyProof of Plaintext-KnowledgePublic Key Cryptosystem
- Contact author(s)
- fischlin @ haendel mi informatik uni-frankfurt de
- History
- 1999-04-19: withdrawn
- 1999-03-05: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/1999/006
- License
-
CC BY
