Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust

Helger Lipmaa; N.  Asokan; Valtteri Niemi

Paper 2001/095

Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust

Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and Valtteri Niemi

Abstract

We argue that threshold trust is not an option in most of the real-life electronic auctions. We then propose two new cryptographic Vickrey auction schemes that involve, apart from the bidders and the seller $S$, an auction authority $A$ so that unless $S$ and $A$ collude the outcome of auctions will be correct, and moreover, $S$ will not get any information about the bids, while $A$ will learn bid statistics. Further extensions make it possible to decrease damage that colluding $S$ and $A$ can do, and to construct $(m+1)$st price auction schemes. The communication complexity between the $S$ and $A$ in medium-size auctions is at least one order of magnitude less than in the Naor-Pinkas-Sumner scheme.

Note: Final version, the changes are minor and mainly cosmetical. More information on this paper is available at http://www.tcs.hut.fi/~helger/papers/lan02

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF PS
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Published in Financial Cryptography 2002.
Keywords: cryptographic auction schemes homomorphic encryption range proofs Vickrey auctions
Contact author(s): helger @ tcs hut fi
History: 2002-05-03: last of 6 revisions; 2001-11-13: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2001/095
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2001/095,
      author = {Helger Lipmaa and N.  Asokan and Valtteri Niemi},
      title = {Secure Vickrey Auctions without Threshold Trust},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2001/095},
      year = {2001},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/095}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2001/095}
}