Paper 2002/180

OMAC: One-Key CBC MAC

Tetsu Iwata and Kaoru Kurosawa

Abstract

In this paper, we present One-key CBC MAC (OMAC) and prove its security for arbitrary length messages. OMAC takes only one key, $K$ ($k$ bits) of a block cipher $E$. Previously, XCBC requires three keys, $(k+2n)$ bits in total, and TMAC requires two keys, $(k+n)$ bits in total, where $n$ denotes the block length of $E$. The saving of the key length makes the security proof of OMAC substantially harder than those of XCBC and TMAC.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Pre-proceedings of FSE 2003
Keywords
CBC MACblock cipherprovable security
Contact author(s)
iwata @ cis ibaraki ac jp
History
2003-03-10: revised
2002-12-01: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2002/180
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2002/180,
      author = {Tetsu Iwata and Kaoru Kurosawa},
      title = {OMAC: One-Key CBC MAC},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2002/180},
      year = {2002},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/180}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/180}
}
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