Paper 2003/196

Security Analysis of Some Proxy Signatures

Guilin Wang, Feng Bao, Jianying Zhou, and Robert H. Deng

Abstract

A proxy signature scheme allows an entity to delegate his/her signing capability to another entity in such a way that the latter can sign messages on behalf of the former. Such schemes have been suggested for use in a number of applications, particularly in distributed computing where delegation of rights is quite common. Followed by the first schemes introduced by Mambo, Usuda and Okamoto in 1996, a number of new schemes and improvements have been proposed. In this paper, we present a security analysis of four such schemes newly proposed in [15,16]. By successfully identifying several interesting forgery attacks, we show that all the four schemes are insecure. Consequently, the fully distributed proxy scheme in [11] is also insecure since it is based on the (insecure) LKK scheme [14,15]. In addition, we point out the reasons why the security proofs provided in [15] are invalid.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Revised version appears in the Proc. of ICISC 2003, LNCS 2971, pp. 305-319. Springer-Verlag, 2004.
Keywords
digital signaturesproxy signaturessecurity analysis.
Contact author(s)
glwang @ i2r a-star edu sg
History
2004-04-12: revised
2003-09-24: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2003/196
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/196,
      author = {Guilin Wang and Feng Bao and Jianying Zhou and Robert H.  Deng},
      title = {Security Analysis of Some Proxy Signatures},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/196},
      year = {2003},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/196}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/196}
}
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