Paper 2003/228

Verifiably Committed Signatures Provably Secure in The Standard Complexity Model

Huafei Zhu

Abstract

In this paper, we study the security notions of verifiably committed signatures by introducing privacy and cut-off time, and then we propose the first scheme which is provably secure in the standard complexity model based on the strong RSA assumption. The idea behind the construction is that given any valid partial signature of messages, if a co-signer with its auxiliary input is able to generate variables called the resolution of messages such that the distribution of the variables is indistinguishable from that generated by the primary signer alone from the views of the verifier/arbitrator, a verifiably committed signature can be constructed.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. New report
Contact author(s)
zhuhf @ zju edu cn
History
2003-11-06: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2003/228
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/228,
      author = {Huafei Zhu},
      title = {Verifiably Committed Signatures Provably Secure in The Standard Complexity Model},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/228},
      year = {2003},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/228}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/228}
}
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