Paper 2003/231

Public-Key Steganography with Active Attacks

Michael Backes and Christian Cachin

Abstract

A complexity-theoretic model for public-key steganography with active attacks is introduced. The notion of steganographic security against adaptive chosen-covertext attacks (SS-CCA) and a relaxation called steganographic security against publicly-detectable replayable adaptive chosen-covertext attacks (SS-PDR-CCA) are formalized. These notions are closely related to CCA-security and PDR-CCA-security for public-key cryptosystems. In particular, it is shown that any SS-(PDR-)CCA stegosystem is a (PDR-)CCA-secure public-key cryptosystem and that an SS-PDR-CCA stegosystem can be realized from any PDR-CCA-secure public-key cryptosystem with pseudorandom ciphertexts.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
steganographyinformation hidingpublic-key cryptography
Contact author(s)
cca @ zurich ibm com
History
2004-08-26: last of 3 revisions
2003-11-06: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2003/231
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/231,
      author = {Michael Backes and Christian Cachin},
      title = {Public-Key Steganography with Active Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/231},
      year = {2003},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/231}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/231}
}
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