How to Break and Repair a Universally Composable Signature Functionality

Michael Backes; Dennis Hofheinz

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Paper 2003/240

How to Break and Repair a Universally Composable Signature Functionality

Michael Backes and Dennis Hofheinz

Abstract

Canetti and Rabin recently proposed a universally composable ideal functionality F_SIG for digital signatures. We show that this functionality cannot be securely realized by \emph{any} signature scheme, thereby disproving their result that any signature scheme that is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attack is a secure realization. Next, an improved signature functionality is presented. We show that our improved functionality can be securely realized by precisely those signature schemes that are secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF PS
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: digital signature schemes universal composability adaptive chosen-message attack
Contact author(s): hofheinz @ ira uka de
History: 2003-11-19: revised; 2003-11-19: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2003/240
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2003/240,
      author = {Michael Backes and Dennis Hofheinz},
      title = {How to Break and Repair a Universally Composable Signature Functionality},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2003/240},
      year = {2003},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/240}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/240}
}