Paper 2004/213

Cryptanalysis of Chang et al.'s Signature Scheme with Message Recovery

Fangguo Zhang

Abstract

Recently, Chang \textit{et al}. \cite{Chang} proposed a new digital signature scheme with message recovery and claimed that neither one-way hash functions nor message redundancy schemes were employed in their scheme. However, in this letter, two forgery attacks are proposed to show that Chang \textit{et al.}'s signature scheme is not secure. To resist these attacks, the message redundancy schemes may be still used.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Digital signature with message recoverymessage redundancy schemesAttack
Contact author(s)
isdzhfg @ zsu edu cn
History
2004-08-30: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2004/213
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/213,
      author = {Fangguo Zhang},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of Chang et al.'s Signature Scheme with Message Recovery},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2004/213},
      year = {2004},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/213}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/213}
}
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