Revisit Of McCullagh--Barreto Two-Party ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols

Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo

Paper 2004/343

Revisit Of McCullagh--Barreto Two-Party ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols

Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo

Abstract

The recently proposed two-party ID-based authenticated key agreement protocols (with and without escrow) and its variant resistant to key-compromise impersonation by McCullagh & Barreto are revisited. The protocol carries a proof of security in the Bellare & Rogaway (1993) model. In this paper, it is demonstrated that the protocols and its variant are not secure if the adversary is allowed to send a Reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s): k choo @ qut edu au
History: 2004-12-08: revised; 2004-12-07: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2004/343
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/343,
      author = {Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo},
      title = {Revisit Of McCullagh--Barreto Two-Party ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2004/343},
      year = {2004},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/343}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/343}
}