Paper 2005/179

Intrusion-Resilience via the Bounded-Storage Model

Stefan Dziembowski

Abstract

We introduce a new method of achieving intrusion-resilience in the cryptographic protocols. More precisely we show how to preserve security of such protocols, even if a malicious program (e.g. a virus) was installed on a computer of an honest user (and it was later removed). The security of our protocols relies on the assumption that the amount of data that the adversary can transfer from the infected machine is limited (however, we allow the adversary to perform any efficient computation on user's private data, before deciding on what to transfer). We focus on two cryptographic tasks, namely: authenticated key exchange and entity authentication. Our method is based on the results from the Bounded-Storage Model.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
key managementbounded-storage model
Contact author(s)
std @ mimuw edu pl
History
2006-06-08: last of 3 revisions
2005-06-15: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2005/179
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/179,
      author = {Stefan Dziembowski},
      title = {Intrusion-Resilience via the Bounded-Storage Model},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2005/179},
      year = {2005},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/179}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/179}
}
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