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Paper 2005/440
HB++: a Lightweight Authentication Protocol Secure against Some Attacks
Julien Bringer, Hervé Chabanne, and Emmanuelle Dottax
Abstract
At Crypto'05, Juels and Weis introduce HB+, an enhancement of the Hopper and Blum (HB) authentication protocol. This protocol HB+ is proven secure against active attacks, though preserving HB's advantages: mainly, requiring so few resources to run that it can be implemented on an RFID tag. However, in a wider adversarial model, Gilbert, Robshaw and Sibert exhibit a very effective attack against HB+. We here show how a modification of the HB+ protocol thwarts Gilbert et al's attack. The resulting protocol, HB++, remains a good candidate for RFID tags authentication.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- -- withdrawn --
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- HB+ protocolactive attacksRFID
- Contact author(s)
- julien bringer @ sagem com
- History
- 2006-02-08: withdrawn
- 2005-12-07: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2005/440
- License
-
CC BY
