Privacy-Preserving Polling using Playing Cards

Sid Stamm; Markus Jakobsson

Paper 2005/444

Privacy-Preserving Polling using Playing Cards

Sid Stamm and Markus Jakobsson

Abstract

Visualizing protocols is not only useful as a step towards understanding and ensuring security properties, but is also a beneficial tool to communicate notions of security to decision makers and technical people outside the field of cryptography. We present a simple card game that is a visualization for a secure protocol for private polling where it is simple to see that individual responses cannot be traced back to a respondent, and cheating is irrational. We use visualization tricks to illustrate a somewhat complex protocol, namely the Cryptographic Randomized Response Technique protocol of Lipmaa et al. While our tools --- commitments and cut-and-choose --- are well known, our construction for oblivious transfer using playing cards is new. As part of visualizing the protocol, we have been able to show that, while cut-and-choose protocols normally get more secure with an increasing number of choices, the protocol we consider --- surprisingly --- does not. This is true for our visualization of the protocol and for the real protocol.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: card game polls privacy randomized response technique rational equilibrium voting
Contact author(s): sstamm @ indiana edu
History: 2005-12-07: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2005/444
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/444,
      author = {Sid Stamm and Markus Jakobsson},
      title = {Privacy-Preserving Polling using Playing Cards},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2005/444},
      year = {2005},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/444}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/444}
}