Paper 2006/143

Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation

Guillaume Fumaroli and David Vigilant

Abstract

As the core operation of many public key cryptosystems, group exponentiation is central to cryptography. Attacks on its implementation in embedded device setting is hence of great concern. Recently, implementations resisting both simple side-channel analysis and fault attacks were proposed. In this paper, we go further and present an algorithm that also inherently thwarts differential side-channel attacks in any finite abelian group with only limited time and storage overhead.

Note: .

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. To appear in Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography - FDTC 2006, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer.
Keywords
public-key cryptographyside-channel analysisfault attacks.
Contact author(s)
guillaume fumaroli @ tremplin-utc net
History
2006-10-04: last of 5 revisions
2006-04-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/143
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/143,
      author = {Guillaume Fumaroli and David Vigilant},
      title = {Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2006/143},
      year = {2006},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/143}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/143}
}
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