Paper 2006/319
Forgery and Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash Collisions
Scott Contini and Yiqun Lisa Yin
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the security of HMAC and NMAC, both of which are hash-based message authentication codes. We present distinguishing, forgery, and partial key recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC using collisions of MD4, MD5, SHA-0, and reduced SHA-1. Our results demonstrate that the strength of a cryptographic scheme can be greatly weakened by the insecurity of the underlying hash function.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. An extended version of a paper to appear in Asiacrypt'06
- Keywords
- hash functionscollisionsNMACHMACmessage authentication codes
- Contact author(s)
- scott_contini @ yahoo com
- History
- 2006-09-21: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/319
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/319,
author = {Scott Contini and Yiqun Lisa Yin},
title = {Forgery and Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash Collisions},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2006/319},
year = {2006},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/319}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/319}
}
