Paper 2006/433

Information Theoretic Bounds on Authentication Systems in Query Model

Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Peter Wild

Abstract

Authentication codes provide message integrity guarantees in an information theoretic sense within a symmetric key setting. Information theoretic bounds on the success probability of an adversary who has access to previously authenticated messages have been derived by Simmons and Rosenbaum, among others. In this paper we consider a strong attack scenario where the adversary is adaptive and has access to authentication and verification oracles. We derive information theoretic bounds on the success probability of the adversary and on the key size of the code. This brings the study of unconditionally secure authentication systems on a par with the study of computationally secure ones. We characterize the codes that meet these bounds and compare our result with the earlier ones.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
information theorymessage authenticationauthentication codes
Contact author(s)
rei @ uow edu au
History
2006-11-21: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/433
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/433,
      author = {Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Peter Wild},
      title = {Information Theoretic Bounds on  Authentication Systems in Query Model},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2006/433},
      year = {2006},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/433}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/433}
}
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