Paper 2006/447

Towards a Separation of Semantic and CCA Security for Public Key Encryption

Yael Gertner, Tal Malkin, and Steven Myers

Abstract

We address the question of whether or not semantically secure public-key encryption primitives imply the existence of chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) secure primitives. We show a black-box separation, using the methodology introduced by Impagliazzo and Rudich, for a large non-trivial class of constructions. In particular, we show that if the proposed CCA construction's decryption algorithm does not query the semantically secure primitive's encryption algorithm, then the proposed construction cannot be CCA secure

Metadata
Available format(s)
PS
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. To Appear in the proceedings of the Theoretical Cryptography Conference (TCC) 07.
Keywords
Public-Key EncryptionCCASemantic SecurityBlack-Box Separation
Contact author(s)
samyers @ indiana edu
History
2006-12-04: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/447
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/447,
      author = {Yael Gertner and Tal Malkin and Steven Myers},
      title = {Towards a Separation of Semantic and CCA Security for Public Key Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2006/447},
      year = {2006},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/447}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/447}
}
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