Paper 2006/454

How to Win the Clone Wars: \\ Efficient Periodic n-Times Anonymous Authentication

Jan Camenisch, Susan Hohenberger, Markulf Kohlweiss, Anna Lysyanskaya, and Mira Meyerovich

Abstract

We create a credential system that lets a user anonymously authenticate at most $n$ times in a single time period. A user withdraws a dispenser of $n$ e-tokens. She shows an e-token to a verifier to authenticate herself; each e-token can be used only once, however, the dispenser automatically refreshes every time period. The only prior solution to this problem, due to Damgård et al.~[DDP05], uses protocols that are a factor of $k$ slower for the user and verifier, where $k$ is the security parameter. Damgård et al. also only support one authentication per time period, while we support $n$. Because our construction is based on e-cash, we can use existing techniques to identify a cheating user, trace all of her e-tokens, and revoke her dispensers. We also offer a new anonymity service: glitch protection for basically honest users who (occasionally) reuse e-tokens. The verifier can always recognize a reused e-token; however, we preserve the anonymity of users who do not reuse e-tokens too often.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Full version of an extended abstract published in Proceedings of ACM CCS 2006, ACM Press.
Keywords
electronic commerce and paymente-cash
Contact author(s)
mira @ cs brown edu
History
2007-04-12: last of 3 revisions
2006-12-04: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/454
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/454,
      author = {Jan Camenisch and Susan Hohenberger and Markulf Kohlweiss and Anna Lysyanskaya and Mira Meyerovich},
      title = {How to Win the Clone Wars: \\ Efficient Periodic n-Times Anonymous Authentication},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2006/454},
      year = {2006},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/454}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/454}
}
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