Paper 2008/346

Remote Integrity Check with Dishonest Storage Server

Ee-Chien Chang and Jia Xu

Abstract

We are interested in this problem: a verifier, with a small and reliable storage, wants to periodically check whether a remote server is keeping a large file $\mathbf{x}$. A dishonest server, by adapting the challenges and responses, tries to discard partial information of $\mathbf{x}$ and yet evades detection. Besides the security requirements, there are considerations on communication, storage size and computation time. Juels et al. \cite{Pors} gave a security model for {\em Proof of Retrievability} ({\POR}) system. The model imposes a requirement that the original ${\bf x}$ can be recovered from multiple challenges-responses. Such requirement is not necessary in our problem. Hence, we propose an alternative security model for {\em Remote Integrity Check} ({\RIC}). We study a few schemes and analyze their efficiency and security. In particular, we prove the security of a proposed scheme {\simplePIR}. This scheme can be deployed as a {\POR} system and it also serves as an example of an effective {\POR} system whose ``extraction'' is not verifiable. We also propose a combination of the RSA-based scheme by Filho et al. \cite{DDPs} and the ECC-based authenticator by Naor et al. \cite{complex_memcheck}, which achieves good asymptotic performance. This scheme is not a {\POR} system and seems to be a secure {\RIC}. In-so-far, all schemes that have been proven secure can also be adopted as {\POR} systems. This brings out the question of whether there are fundamental differences between the two models. To highlight the differences, we introduce a notion, {\em trap-door compression}, that captures a property on compressibility.

Note: Some minor changes.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Integrity CheckPeer-2-peer applications
Contact author(s)
xujia @ comp nus edu sg
History
2008-11-03: last of 2 revisions
2008-08-11: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/346
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/346,
      author = {Ee-Chien Chang and Jia Xu},
      title = {Remote Integrity Check with  Dishonest Storage Server},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2008/346},
      year = {2008},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/346}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/346}
}
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