Paper 2008/413

Password Mistyping in Two-Factor-Authenticated Key Exchange

Vladimir Kolesnikov and Charles Rackoff

Abstract

Abstract: We study the problem of Key Exchange (KE), where authentication is two-factor and based on both electronically stored long keys and human-supplied credentials (passwords or biometrics). The latter credential has low entropy and may be adversarily mistyped. Our main contribution is the first formal treatment of mistyping in this setting. Ensuring security in presence of mistyping is subtle. We show mistyping-related limitations of previous KE definitions and constructions. We concentrate on the practical two-factor authenticated KE setting where servers exchange keys with clients, who use short passwords (memorized) and long cryptographic keys (stored on a card). Our work is thus a natural generalization of Halevi-Krawczyk and Kolesnikov-Rackoff. We discuss the challenges that arise due to mistyping. We propose the first KE definitions in this setting, and formally discuss their guarantees. We present efficient KE protocols and prove their security.

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Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. ICALP 2008
Keywords
Key exchangedefinitioncombined keyspasswordbiometric
Contact author(s)
kolesnikov @ research bell-labs com
History
2008-10-08: revised
2008-10-02: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/413
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/413,
      author = {Vladimir Kolesnikov and Charles Rackoff},
      title = {Password Mistyping in Two-Factor-Authenticated Key Exchange},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2008/413},
      year = {2008},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/413}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/413}
}
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