Paper 2008/497

On the Correctness of An Approach Against Side-channel attacks

Peng Wang, Dengguo Feng, Wenling Wu, and Liting Zhang

Abstract

Side-channel attacks are a very powerful cryptanalytic technique. Li and Gu [ProvSec'07] proposed an approach against side-channel attacks, which states that a symmetric encryption scheme is IND-secure in side-channel model, if it is IND-secure in black-box model and there is no adversary who can recover the whole key of the scheme computationally in side-channel model, i.e. WKR-SCA ^ IND -> IND-SCA. Our researches show that it is not the case. We analyze notions of security against key recovery attacks and security against distinguishing attacks, and then construct a scheme which is WKR-SCA-secure and IND-secure, but not IND-SCA-secure in the same side-channel environment. Furthermore, even if the scheme is secure again partial key recovery attacks in side-channel model, this approach still does not hold true.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Provable securitySide-channel attackSymmetric encryption
Contact author(s)
wp @ is ac cn
History
2008-12-02: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/497
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/497,
      author = {Peng Wang and Dengguo Feng and Wenling Wu and Liting Zhang},
      title = {On the Correctness of An Approach Against Side-channel attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2008/497},
      year = {2008},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/497}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/497}
}
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