Paper 2009/592

From Passive to Covert Security at Low Cost

Ivan Damgård, Martin Geisler, and Jesper Buus Nielsen

Abstract

Aumann and Lindell defined security against covert attacks, where the adversary is malicious, but is only caught cheating with a certain probability. The idea is that in many real-world cases, a large probability of being caught is sufficient to prevent the adversary from trying to cheat. In this paper, we show how to compile a passively secure protocol for honest majority into one that is secure against covert attacks, again for honest majority and catches cheating with probability 1/4. The cost of the modified protocol is essentially twice that of the original plus an overhead that only depends on the number of inputs.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. The paper has been accepted for TCC 2010; this is the full version.
Keywords
covert adversary
Contact author(s)
mg @ cs au dk
History
2009-12-04: revised
2009-12-04: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/592
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/592,
      author = {Ivan Damgård and Martin Geisler and Jesper Buus Nielsen},
      title = {From Passive to Covert Security at Low Cost},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2009/592},
      year = {2009},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/592}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/592}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.