Paper 2009/628

Using Sphinx to Improve Onion Routing Circuit Construction

Aniket Kate and Ian Goldberg

Abstract

This paper presents compact message formats for onion routing circuit construction using the Sphinx methodology developed for mixes. We significantly compress the circuit construction messages for three onion routing protocols that have emerged as enhancements to the Tor anonymizing network; namely, Tor with predistributed Diffie-Hellman values, pairing-based onion routing, and certificateless onion routing. Our new circuit constructions are also secure in the universal composability framework, a property that was missing from the original constructions. Further, we compare the performance of our schemes with their older counterparts as well as with each other.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. This is the full version of our paper appearing in the 14th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2010).
Contact author(s)
akate @ cs uwaterloo ca
History
2009-12-26: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/628
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/628,
      author = {Aniket Kate and Ian Goldberg},
      title = {Using Sphinx to Improve Onion Routing Circuit Construction},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2009/628},
      year = {2009},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/628}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/628}
}
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