Paper 2010/032

An Information Theoretic Perspective on the Differential Fault Analysis against AES

Yang Li, Shigeto Gomisawa, Kazuo Sakiyama, and Kazuo Ohta

Abstract

Differential Fault Analysis against AES has been actively studied these years. Based on similar assumptions of the fault injection, different DFA attacks against AES have been proposed. However, it is difficult to understand how different attack results are obtained for the same fault injection. It is also difficult to understand the relationship between similar assumptions of fault injection and the corresponding attack results. This paper reviews the previous DFA attacks against AES based on the information theory, and gives a general and easy understanding of DFA attacks against AES. We managed to apply the analysis on DFA attacks on AES-192 and AES-256, and we propose the attack procedures to reach the theoretically minimal number of fault injections.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Differential Fault AnalysisAESInformation theory
Contact author(s)
liyang @ ice uec ac jp
History
2010-07-23: last of 3 revisions
2010-01-22: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/032
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/032,
      author = {Yang Li and Shigeto Gomisawa and Kazuo Sakiyama and Kazuo Ohta},
      title = {An Information Theoretic Perspective on the Differential Fault Analysis against AES},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/032},
      year = {2010},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/032}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/032}
}
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