Paper 2011/283

The Fault Attack ECDLP Revisited

Mingqiang Wang, Xiaoyun Wang, and Tao Zhan

Abstract

Biehl et al.\cite{BMM} proposed a fault-based attack on elliptic curve cryptography. In this paper, we refined the fault attack method. An elliptic curve $E$ is defined over prime field $\mathbb{F}_p$ with base point $P\in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$. Applying the fault attack on these curves, the discrete logarithm on the curve can be computed in subexponential time of $L_p(1/2, 1+o(1))$. The runtime bound relies on heuristics conjecture about smooth numbers similar to the ones used in \cite{Lens}.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s)
wangmingqiang @ sdu edu cn
History
2011-06-03: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/283
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/283,
      author = {Mingqiang Wang and Xiaoyun Wang and Tao Zhan},
      title = {The Fault Attack ECDLP Revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/283},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/283}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/283}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.