Paper 2011/568

Single Layer Optical-scan Voting with Fully Distributed Trust

Aleksander Essex, Christian Henrich, and Urs Hengartner

Abstract

We present a new approach for cryptographic end-to-end verifiable optical-scan voting. Ours is the first that does not rely on a single point of trust to protect ballot secrecy while simultaneously offering a conventional single layer ballot form and unencrypted paper trail. We present two systems following this approach. The first system uses ballots with randomized confirmation codes and a physical in-person dispute resolution procedure. The second system improves upon the first by offering an informational dispute resolution procedure and a public paper audit trail through the use of self-blanking invisible ink confirmation codes. We then present a security analysis of the improved system.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Full version of paper appearing at the 3rd international conference on E-voting and Identity (VoteID 2011)
Keywords
election schemes
Contact author(s)
aessex @ cs uwaterloo ca
History
2011-10-22: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/568
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/568,
      author = {Aleksander Essex and Christian Henrich and Urs Hengartner},
      title = {Single Layer Optical-scan Voting with Fully Distributed Trust},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/568},
      year = {2011},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/568}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/568}
}
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