UC-Secure Multi-Session OT Using Tamper-Proof Hardware

Kaoru Kurosawa; Ro Nojima; Le Trieu Phong

Paper 2013/077

UC-Secure Multi-Session OT Using Tamper-Proof Hardware

Kaoru Kurosawa, Ro Nojima, and Le Trieu Phong

Abstract

In this paper, we show the first UC-secure {\it multi-session} OT protocol using tamper-proof hardware tokens. The sender and the receiver exchange tokens only at the beginning. Then these tokens are reused in arbitrarily many sessions of OT. The proposed scheme is UC-secure against static adversaries if the DDH assumption holds and a unique signature scheme exists. There exist a unique signature schemes under the Many DH assumption or under the DDHE assumption (in the standard model).

Note: The random oracle is removed.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: tamper-proof hardware token UC-security multi-session OT
Contact author(s): kurosawa @ mx ibaraki ac jp
History: 2013-04-24: last of 2 revisions; 2013-02-20: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2013/077
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/077,
      author = {Kaoru Kurosawa and Ro Nojima and Le Trieu Phong},
      title = {UC-Secure Multi-Session OT Using Tamper-Proof Hardware},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/077},
      year = {2013},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/077}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/077}
}