Paper 2013/269

CMCC: Misuse Resistant Authenticated Encryption with Minimal Ciphertext Expansion

Jonathan Trostle

Abstract

In some wireless environments, minimizing the size of messages is paramount due to the resulting significant energy savings. We present CMCC, an authenticated encryption scheme with associated data (AEAD) that is also nonce misuse resistant. The main focus for this work is minimizing ciphertext expansion, especially for short messages including plaintext lengths less than the underlying block cipher length (e.g., 16 bytes). For many existing AEAD schemes, a successful forgery leads directly to a loss of confidentiality. For CMCC, changes to the ciphertext randomize the resulting plaintext, thus forgeries do not necessarily result in a loss of confidentiality which allows us to reduce the length of the authentication tag. For protocols that send short messages, our scheme is similar to Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) for computational overhead but has much smaller expansion. We prove both a misuse resistant authenticated encryption (MRAE) security bound and an authenticated encryption (AE) security bound for CMCC. We also present a variation of CMCC, CWM, which provides a further strengthening of the security bounds. Our contributions include both stateless and stateful versions which enable minimal sized message numbers using different network related trade-offs.

Note: Revised version.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Has not been published elsewhere
Keywords
Energy constrained cryptographyauthenticated encryption.
Contact author(s)
jon49175 @ yahoo com
History
2017-07-10: last of 16 revisions
2013-05-13: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/269
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/269,
      author = {Jonathan Trostle},
      title = {CMCC: Misuse Resistant Authenticated Encryption with Minimal Ciphertext Expansion},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/269},
      year = {2013},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/269}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/269}
}
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