Eavesdropping or Disrupting a Communication  --- On the Weakness of Quantum Communications

Zhengjun Cao

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Paper 2013/474

Eavesdropping or Disrupting a Communication --- On the Weakness of Quantum Communications

Zhengjun Cao

Abstract

What is the behavior of an adversary to launch attacks against a communication? The good choice is to eavesdrop the communication such that the communicators can not detect the eavesdropping. The general choice is to disrupt the communication at low cost, say, measuring the transferred quantum signals in the well-known BB84 quantum key distribution protocol. The bad choice is to disrupt it at even high cost, such as severing copper or fiber, if it is necessary. In this note we remark that a quantum communication is very vulnerable to low cost attacks. The plan to build a large quantum photonic network is infeasible.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Foundations
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: quantum cryptography
Contact author(s): caozhj @ shu edu cn
History: 2013-08-03: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2013/474
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/474,
      author = {Zhengjun Cao},
      title = {Eavesdropping or Disrupting a Communication  --- On the Weakness of Quantum Communications},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/474},
      year = {2013},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/474}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/474}
}