Paper 2013/666
An Offline Dictionary Attack against a Three-Party Key Exchange Protocol
Junghyun Nam, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Juryon Paik, and Dongho Won
Abstract
Despite all the research efforts made so far, the design of protocols for password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) still remains a non-trivial task. One of the major challenges in designing such protocols is to protect low-entropy passwords from the notorious dictionary attacks. In this work, we revisit Abdalla and Pointcheval's three-party PAKE protocol presented in Financial Cryptography 2005, and demonstrate that the protocol is vulnerable to an off-line dictionary attack whereby a malicious client can find out the passwords of other clients.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE)three-party key exchangepassworddictionary attack.
- Contact author(s)
- jhnam @ kku ac kr
- History
- 2013-10-24: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/666
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/666,
author = {Junghyun Nam and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo and Juryon Paik and Dongho Won},
title = {An Offline Dictionary Attack against a Three-Party Key Exchange Protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/666},
year = {2013},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/666}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/666}
}
