Paper 2014/342

Proposing Individualization of the design of cryptographic hardware accelerators as countermeasure against structure and side channel analysis

Zoya Dyka, Thomas Basmer, Christian Wittke, and Peter Langendoerfer

Abstract

Side channel and fault attacks take advantage from the fact that the behavior of crypto implementations can be observed and provide hints that simplify revealing keys. These attacks are normally prepared by analyzing devices that are identical to the real target. Here we propose to individualize the design of cryptographic devices in order to prevent attacks that use identical devices. We implemented three different designs that provide exactly the same cryptographic function, i.e. an ECC kP multiplication. The synthesis and power simulation results show clear differences in the area consumed as well as in the power traces. We envision that this type of protection mechanism is relevant e.g. for wireless sensor networks from which devices can easily be stolen for further analysis in the lab.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
implementation elliptic curve cryptography
Contact author(s)
dyka @ ihp-microelectronics com
History
2015-03-19: revised
2014-05-19: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/342
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/342,
      author = {Zoya Dyka and Thomas Basmer and Christian Wittke and Peter Langendoerfer},
      title = {Proposing Individualization of the design of cryptographic hardware accelerators as countermeasure against structure and side channel analysis},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/342},
      year = {2014},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/342}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/342}
}
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