Paper 2014/492
Fault attacks on pairing-based protocols revisited
Sanjit Chatterjee, Koray Karabina, and Alfred Menezes
Abstract
Several papers have studied fault attacks on computing a pairing value e(P,Q), where P is a public point and Q is a secret point. In this paper, we observe that these attacks are in fact effective only on a small number of pairing-based protocols, and that too only when the protocols are implemented with specific symmetric pairings. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the fault attacks on a public-key encryption scheme, an identity-based encryption scheme, and an oblivious transfer protocol when implemented with a symmetric pairing derived from a supersingular elliptic curve with embedding degree 2.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Fault attackspairing-based cryptographysupersingular elliptic curves
- Contact author(s)
- kkarabina @ fau edu
- History
- 2014-07-10: revised
- 2014-06-23: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/492
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/492,
author = {Sanjit Chatterjee and Koray Karabina and Alfred Menezes},
title = {Fault attacks on pairing-based protocols revisited},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/492},
year = {2014},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/492}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/492}
}
