Paper 2014/707

Analysis Of Variance and CPA in SCA

Sebastien Tiran, Guillaume Reymond, Jean-Baptiste Rigaud, Driss Aboulkassimi, Benedikt Gierlichs, Mathieu Carbone, Gilles Ducharme, and Philippe Maurine

Abstract

This paper introduces Side-Channel Analysis results obtained on an unprotected circuit characterized by a surprisingly non-linear leakage. While in such a case, Correlation Power Analysis is not adapted, we show that a more generic attack, based on the Analysis Of Variance (AOV) outperfoms CPA. It has the advantage of detecting non-linear leakage, unlike Correlation Power Analysis, and of providing similar or much better results in all cases, with a similar computation time.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
SCAAOVCPAleakage
Contact author(s)
sebastien tiran @ lirmm fr
History
2014-09-09: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/707
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/707,
      author = {Sebastien Tiran and Guillaume Reymond and Jean-Baptiste Rigaud and Driss Aboulkassimi and Benedikt Gierlichs and Mathieu Carbone and Gilles Ducharme and Philippe Maurine},
      title = {Analysis Of Variance and CPA in SCA},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/707},
      year = {2014},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/707}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/707}
}
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