Paper 2015/716
Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round SIMECK Variants
Nasour Bagheri
Abstract
SIMECK is a family of 3 lightweight block ciphers designed by Yang et al. They follow the framework used by Beaulieu et al. from the United States National Security Agency (NSA) to design SIMON and SPECK. A cipher in this family with K-bit key and N-bit block is called SIMECKN=K.We show that the security of this block cipher against linear cryptanalysis is not as good as its predecessors SIMON. More precisely, while the best known linear attack for SIMON32/64, using algorithm 1 of Matsui, covers 13 rounds we present a linear attack in this senario which covers 14 rounds of SIMECK32/64. Similarly, using algorithm 1 of Matsui, we present attacks on 19 and 22 rounds of SIMECK48/96 and SIMECK64/128 respectively, compare them with known attacks on 16 and 19 rounds SIMON48/96 and SIMON64/128 respectively. In addition, we use algorithm 2 of Matsui to attack 18, 23 and 27 rounds of SIMECK32/64, SIMECK48/96 and SIMECK64/128 respectively, compare them with known attacks on 18, 19 and 21 rounds SIMON32/64, SIMON48/96 and SIMON64/128 respectively.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. INDOCRYPT 2015
- Keywords
- SIMECKSIMONSPECKLinear Cryptanalysis.
- Contact author(s)
- na bagheri @ gmail com
- History
- 2015-09-17: revised
- 2015-07-20: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/716
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/716,
author = {Nasour Bagheri},
title = {Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round SIMECK Variants},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/716},
year = {2015},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/716}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/716}
}
