Paper 2015/948

A Provably Secure Short Signature Scheme from Coding Theory

Maryam Rajabzadeh Asaar, Mahmoud Salmasizadeh, and Mohammad Reza Aref

Abstract

Signatures with partially message recovery in which some parts of messages are not transmitted with signatures to make them shorter are useful where bandwidth is one of the crucial concern and especially in case of signing short messages in applications such as time stamping, certified email services and identitybased cryptosystems. In this paper, to have quantum-attackresistant short signatures, a signature scheme with partially message recovery from coding theory is proposed. The security of the proposed scheme is proved under Goppa Parametrized Bounded Decoding and the Goppa Code Distinguishing assumptions in the random oracle model. Relying on the partially message recovery property, the proposal is shorter than the Dallot signature scheme, the only provably secure and practical code-based signature scheme. We should highlight that our scheme can be used as a building block of code-based signature schemes with additional properties since it compared to Dallot signature scheme not only improves its communication overhead but also it preserves its signature efficiency.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
code-based signaturessignatures with message recoveryprovable securityrandom oracle model
Contact author(s)
mar61_rh @ yahoo com
History
2015-09-28: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/948
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/948,
      author = {Maryam Rajabzadeh Asaar and Mahmoud Salmasizadeh and Mohammad Reza Aref},
      title = {A Provably Secure Short Signature Scheme from Coding Theory},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/948},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/948}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/948}
}
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