## CryptoDB

### Mukul Kulkarni

#### Publications

**Year**

**Venue**

**Title**

2020

CRYPTO

New Techniques for Zero-Knowledge: Leveraging Inefficient Provers to Reduce Assumptions, Interaction, and Trust
📺
Abstract

We present a transformation from NIZK with inefficient provers in the uniform random string (URS) model to ZAPs (two message witness indistinguishable proofs) with inefficient provers. While such a transformation was known for the case where the prover is efficient, the security proof breaks down if the prover is inefficient. Our transformation is obtained via new applications of Nisan-Wigderson designs, a combinatorial object originally introduced in the derandomization literature.
We observe that our transformation is applicable both in the setting of super-polynomial provers/poly-time adversaries, as well as a new fine-grained setting, where the prover is polynomial time and the verifier/simulator/zero knowledge distinguisher are in a lower complexity class, such as $\mathsf{NC}^1$. We also present $\mathsf{NC}^1$-fine-grained NIZK in the URS model for all of NP from the worst-case assumption $\oplus L/\poly \not\subseteq \mathsf{NC}^1$.
Our techniques yield the following applications:
--ZAPs for $\mathsf{AM}$ from Minicrypt assumptions (with super-polynomial time provers),
--$\mathsf{NC}^1$-fine-grained ZAPs for $\mathsf{NP}$ from worst-case assumptions,
--Protocols achieving an ``offline'' notion of NIZK (oNIZK) in the standard (no-CRS) model with uniform soundness in both the super-polynomial setting (from Minicrypt assumptions) and
the $\mathsf{NC}^1$-fine-grained setting (from worst-case assumptions). The oNIZK notion is sufficient for use in indistinguishability-based proofs.

2019

PKC

Upper and Lower Bounds for Continuous Non-Malleable Codes
Abstract

Recently, Faust et al. (TCC’14) introduced the notion of continuous non-malleable codes (CNMC), which provides stronger security guarantees than standard non-malleable codes, by allowing an adversary to tamper with the codeword in a continuous way instead of one-time tampering. They also showed that CNMC with information theoretic security cannot be constructed in the 2-split-state tampering model, and presented a construction in the common reference string (CRS) model from collision-resistant hash functions and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.In this work, we ask if it is possible to construct CNMC from weaker assumptions. We answer this question by presenting lower as well as upper bounds. We show that it is impossible to construct 2-split-state CNMC, with no CRS, for one-bit messages from any falsifiable assumption, thus establishing the lower bound. We additionally provide an upper bound by constructing 2-split-state CNMC for one-bit messages, assuming only the existence of a family of injective one way functions. We note that in a recent work, Ostrovsky et al. (CRYPTO’18) considered the construction of a relaxed notion of 2-split-state CNMC from minimal assumptions.We also present a construction of 4-split-state CNMC for multi-bit messages in CRS model from the same assumptions. Additionally, we present definitions of the following new primitives: (1) One-to-one commitments, and (2) Continuous Non-Malleable Randomness Encoders, which may be of independent interest.

2019

EUROCRYPT

Non-Malleable Codes Against Bounded Polynomial Time Tampering
📺
Abstract

We construct efficient non-malleable codes (NMC) that are (computationally) secure against tampering by functions computable in any fixed polynomial time. Our construction is in the plain (no-CRS) model and requires the assumptions that (1) $$\mathbf {E}$$E is hard for $$\mathbf {NP}$$NP circuits of some exponential $$2^{\beta n}$$2βn ($$\beta >0$$β>0) size (widely used in the derandomization literature), (2) sub-exponential trapdoor permutations exist, and (3) $$\mathbf {P}$$P-certificates with sub-exponential soundness exist.While it is impossible to construct NMC secure against arbitrary polynomial-time tampering (Dziembowski, Pietrzak, Wichs, ICS ’10), the existence of NMC secure against $$O(n^c)$$O(nc)-time tampering functions (for any fixedc), was shown (Cheraghchi and Guruswami, ITCS ’14) via a probabilistic construction. An explicit construction was given (Faust, Mukherjee, Venturi, Wichs, Eurocrypt ’14) assuming an untamperable CRS with length longer than the runtime of the tampering function. In this work, we show that under computational assumptions, we can bypass these limitations. Specifically, under the assumptions listed above, we obtain non-malleable codes in the plain model against $$O(n^c)$$O(nc)-time tampering functions (for any fixed c), with codeword length independent of the tampering time bound.Our new construction of NMC draws a connection with non-interactive non-malleable commitments. In fact, we show that in the NMC setting, it suffices to have a much weaker notion called quasi non-malleable commitments—these are non-interactive, non-malleable commitments in the plain model, in which the adversary runs in $$O(n^c)$$O(nc)-time, whereas the honest parties may run in longer (polynomial) time. We then construct a 4-tag quasi non-malleable commitment from any sub-exponential OWF and the assumption that $$\mathbf {E}$$E is hard for some exponential size $$\mathbf {NP}$$NP-circuits, and use tag amplification techniques to support an exponential number of tags.

2018

EUROCRYPT

2018

PKC

Local Non-malleable Codes in the Bounded Retrieval Model
Abstract

In a recent result, Dachman-Soled et al. (TCC ’15) proposed a new notion called locally decodable and updatable non-malleable codes, which informally, provides the security guarantees of a non-malleable code while also allowing for efficient random access. They also considered locally decodable and updatable non-malleable codes that are leakage-resilient, allowing for adversaries who continually leak information in addition to tampering.The bounded retrieval model (BRM) (cf. Alwen et al. (CRYPTO ’09) and Alwen et al. (EUROCRYPT ’10)) has been studied extensively in the setting of leakage resilience for cryptographic primitives. This threat model assumes that an attacker can learn information about the secret key, subject only to the constraint that the overall amount of leaked information is upper bounded by some value. The goal is then to construct cryptosystems whose secret key length grows with the amount of leakage, but whose runtime (assuming random access to the secret key) is independent of the leakage amount.In this work, we combine the above two notions and construct local non-malleable codes in the split-state model, that are secure against bounded retrieval adversaries. Specifically, given leakage parameter $$\ell $$ℓ, we show how to construct an efficient, 3-split-state, locally decodable and updatable code (with CRS) that is secure against one-time leakage of any polynomial time, 3-split-state leakage function whose output length is at most $$\ell $$ℓ, and one-time tampering via any polynomial-time 3-split-state tampering function. The locality we achieve is polylogarithmic in the security parameter.

#### Coauthors

- Marshall Ball (4)
- Dana Dachman-Soled (7)
- Huijia Lin (1)
- Tal Malkin (3)
- Aria Shahverdi (2)