International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Jörn Müller-Quade

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2022
PKC
A New Security Notion for PKC in the Standard Model: Weaker, Simpler, and Still Realizing Secure Channels
Encryption satisfying CCA2 security is commonly known to be unnecessarily strong for realizing secure channels. Moreover, CCA2 constructions in the standard model are far from being competitive practical alternatives to constructions via random oracle. A promising research area to alleviate this problem are weaker security notions—like IND-RCCA secure encryption or IND-atag-wCCA secure tag-based encryption—which are still able to facilitate secure message transfer (SMT) via authenticated channels. In this paper we introduce the concept of sender-binding encryption (SBE), unifying prior approaches of SMT construction in the universal composability (UC) model. We furthermore develop the corresponding non-trivial security notion of IND-SB-CPA and formally prove that it suffices for realizing SMT in conjunction with authenticated channels. Our notion is the weakest so far in the sense that it can be generically constructed from the weakest prior notions—RCCA and atag-wCCA—without additional assumptions, while the reverse is not true. A direct consequence is that IND-stag-wCCA, which is strictly weaker than IND-atag-wCCA but stronger than our IND-SB-CPA, can be used to construct a secure channel. Finally, we give an efficient IND-SB-CPA secure construction in the standard model from IND-CPA secure double receiver encryption (DRE) based on McEliece. This shows that IND-SB-CPA security yields simpler and more efficient constructions in the standard model than the weakest prior notions, i.e., IND-atag-wCCA and IND-stag-wCCA.
2021
ASIACRYPT
ConTra Corona: Contact Tracing against the Coronavirus by Bridging the Centralized–Decentralized Divide for Stronger Privacy 📺
Contact tracing is among the most important interventions to mitigate the spread of any pandemic usually in the form of manual contact tracing. Smartphone-facilitated digital contact tracing may help to increase tracing capabilities and extend the coverage to those contacts one does not know in person. Most implemented protocols use local Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) communication to detect contagion-relevant proximity, together with cryptographic protections, as necessary to improve the privacy of the users of such a system. However, current decentralized protocols, including DP3T, do not sufficiently protect infected users from having their status revealed to their contacts, which raises fear of stigmatization. We alleviate this by proposing a new and practical solution with stronger privacy guarantees against active adversaries. It is based on the upload-what-you-observed paradigm, includes a separation of duties on the server side, and a mechanism to ensure that users cannot deduce which encounter caused a warning with high time resolution. Finally, we present a simulation-based security notion of digital contact tracing in the real–ideal setting, and prove the security of our protocol in this framework.
2021
TCC
Environmentally Friendly Composable Multi-Party Computation in the Plain Model from Standard (Timed) Assumptions 📺
Brandon Broadnax Jeremias Mechler Jörn Müller-Quade
Starting with the work of Rivest et al. in 1996, timed assumptions have found many applications in cryptography, building e.g. the foundation of the blockchain technology. They also have been used in the context of classical MPC, e.g. to enable fairness. We follow this line of research to obtain composable general MPC in the plain model. This approach comes with a major advantage regarding environmental friendliness, a property coined by Canetti et al. (FOCS 2013). Informally, this means that our constructions do not “hurt” game-based security properties of protocols that hold against polynomial-time adversaries when executed alone. As an additional property, our constructions can be plugged into any UC-secure protocol without loss of security. Towards proving the security of our constructions, we introduce a variant of the UC security notion that captures timed cryptographic assumptions. Combining standard timed commitment schemes and standard polynomial-time hardness assumptions, we construct a composable commitment scheme in the plain model. As this construction is constant-round and black-box, we obtain the first fully environmentally friendly composable constant-round black-box general MPC protocol in the plain model from standard (timed) assumptions.
2018
PKC
Reusing Tamper-Proof Hardware in UC-Secure Protocols
Jeremias Mechler Jörn Müller-Quade Tobias Nilges
Universally composable protocols provide security even in highly complex environments like the Internet. Without setup assumptions, however, UC-secure realizations of cryptographic tasks are impossible. Tamper-proof hardware tokens, e.g. smart cards and USB tokens, can be used for this purpose. Apart from the fact that they are widely available, they are also cheap to manufacture and well understood.Currently considered protocols, however, suffer from two major drawbacks that impede their practical realization:The functionality of the tokens is protocol-specific, i.e. each protocol requires a token functionality tailored to its need.Different protocols cannot reuse the same token even if they require the same functionality from the token, because this would render the protocols insecure in current models of tamper-proof hardware. In this paper we address these problems. First and foremost, we propose formalizations of tamper-proof hardware as an untrusted and global setup assumption. Modeling the token as a global setup naturally allows to reuse the tokens for arbitrary protocols. Concerning a versatile token functionality we choose a simple signature functionality, i.e. the tokens can be instantiated with currently available signature cards. Based on this we present solutions for a large class of cryptographic tasks.
2018
PKC
Non-malleability vs. CCA-Security: The Case of Commitments
In this work, we settle the relations among a variety of security notions related to non-malleability and CCA-security that have been proposed for commitment schemes in the literature. Interestingly, all our separations follow from two generic transformations. Given two appropriate security notions X and Y from the class of security notions we compare, these transformations take a commitment scheme that fulfills notion X and output a commitment scheme that still fulfills notion X but not notion Y.Using these transformations, we are able to show that some of the known relations for public-key encryption do not carry over to commitments. In particular, we show that, surprisingly, parallel non-malleability and parallel CCA-security are not equivalent for commitment schemes. This stands in contrast to the situation for public-key encryption where these two notions are equivalent as shown by Bellare et al. at CRYPTO ‘99.
2017
EUROCRYPT
2015
TCC
2013
TCC
2013
EUROCRYPT
2013
JOFC
Polynomial Runtime and Composability
Dennis Hofheinz Dominique Unruh Jörn Müller-Quade
We devise a notion of polynomial runtime suitable for the simulation-based security analysis of multi-party cryptographic protocols. Somewhat surprisingly, straightforward notions of polynomial runtime lack expressivity for reactive tasks and/or lead to an unnatural simulation-based security notion. Indeed, the problem has been recognized in previous works, and several notions of polynomial runtime have already been proposed. However, our new notion, dubbed reactive polynomial time, is the first to combine the following properties: it is simple enough to support simple security/runtime analyses,it is intuitive in the sense that all intuitively feasible protocols and attacks (and only those) are considered polynomial-time,it supports secure composition of protocols in the sense of a universal composition theorem. We work in the Universal Composability (UC) protocol framework. We remark that while the UC framework already features a universal composition theorem, we develop new techniques to prove secure composition in the case of reactively polynomial-time protocols and attacks.
2012
ASIACRYPT
2011
TCC
2011
TCC
2010
JOFC
2010
CRYPTO
2009
TCC
2007
TCC
2007
TCC
2006
EUROCRYPT
2004
TCC

Program Committees

TCC 2019
Crypto 2014