International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Jintai Ding

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2021
EUROCRYPT
The Nested Subset Differential Attack: A Practical Direct Attack Against LUOV which Forges a Signature within 210 Minutes 📺
In 2017, Ward Beullenset al.submitted Lifted Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar [4], which is a modification to the Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar Schemeby Patarin. Previously, Ding et al.proposed the Subfield Differential Attack [20]which prompted a change of parameters by the authors of LUOV for the second round of the NIST post quantum standardization competition [3].In this paper we propose a modification to the Subfield Differential Attackcalled the Nested Subset Differential Attack which fully breaks half of the parameter sets put forward. We also show by experimentation that this attack is practically possible to do in under 210 minutes for the level I security parameters and not just a theoretical attack. The Nested Subset Differential attack is a large improvement of the Subfield differential attack which can be used in real world circumstances. Moreover, we will only use what is called the "lifted" structure of LUOV, and our attack can be thought as a development of solving"lifted" quadratic systems.
2021
CRYPTO
Efficient Key Recovery for all HFE Signature Variants 📺
The HFE cryptosystem is one of the best known multivariate schemes. Especially in the area of digital signatures, the HFEv- variant offers short signatures and high performance. Recently, an instance of the HFEv- signature scheme called GeMSS was elected as one of the alternative candidates for signature schemes in the third round of the NIST Post Quantum Crypto (PQC) Standardization Project. In this paper, we propose a new key recovery attack on the HFEv- signature scheme. Our attack shows that both the Minus and the Vinegar modifi- cation do not enhance the security of the basic HFE scheme significantly. This shows that it is very difficult to build a secure and efficient signature scheme on the basis of HFE. In particular, we use our attack to show that the proposed parameters of the GeMSS scheme are not as secure as claimed.
2021
ASIACRYPT
A Systematic Approach and Analysis of Key Mismatch Attacks on Lattice-Based NIST Candidate KEMs 📺
Research on key mismatch attacks against lattice-based KEMs is an important part of the cryptographic assessment of the ongoing NIST standardization of post-quantum cryptography. There have been a number of these attacks to date. However, a unified method to evaluate these KEMs' resilience under key mismatch attacks is still missing. Since the key index of efficiency is the number of queries needed to successfully mount such an attack, in this paper, we propose and develop a systematic approach to find lower bounds on the minimum average number of queries needed for such attacks. Our basic idea is to transform the problem of finding the lower bound of queries into finding an optimal binary recovery tree (BRT), where the computations of the lower bounds become essentially the computations of a certain Shannon entropy. The optimal BRT approach also enables us to understand why, for some lattice-based NIST candidate KEMs, there is a big gap between the theoretical bounds and bounds observed in practical attacks, in terms of the number of queries needed. This further leads us to propose a generic improvement method for these existing attacks, which are confirmed by our experiments. Moreover, our proposed method could be directly used to improve the side-channel attacks against CCA-secure NIST candidate KEMs.
2020
CRYPTO
Cryptanalysis of The Lifted Unbalanced Oil Vinegar Signature Scheme 📺
In 2017, Ward Beullens et al. submitted Lifted Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (LUOV), a signature scheme based on the famous multivariate public-key cryptosystem (MPKC) called Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (UOV), to NIST for the competition for post-quantum public-key scheme standardization. The defining feature of LUOV is that, though the public key P works in the extension field of degree r of F2, the coefficients of P come from F2. This is done to significantly reduce the size of P. The LUOV scheme is now in the second round of the NIST PQC standardization process. In this paper, we introduce a new attack on LUOV. It exploits the "lifted" structure of LUOV to reduce direct attacks on it to those over a subfield. We show that this reduces the complexity below the targeted security for the NIST postquantum standardization competition.
2015
EUROCRYPT
2015
ASIACRYPT
2011
CRYPTO
2009
CHES
2007
PKC
2007
PKC
2006
PKC
2005
PKC
2004
PKC

Program Committees

PKC 2013