International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Marten van Dijk


Splitting the Interpose PUF: A Novel Modeling Attack Strategy 📺
We demonstrate that the Interpose PUF proposed at CHES 2019, an Arbiter PUF-based design for so-called Strong Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), can be modeled by novel machine learning strategies up to very substantial sizes and complexities. Our attacks require in the most difficult cases considerable, but realistic, numbers of CRPs, while consuming only moderate computation times, ranging from few seconds to few days. The attacks build on a new divide-and-conquer approach that allows us to model the two building blocks of the Interpose PUF separately. For non-reliability based Machine Learning (ML) attacks, this eventually leads to attack times on (kup, kdown)-Interpose PUFs that are comparable to the ones against max{kup, kdown}-XOR Arbiter PUFs, refuting the original claim that Interpose PUFs could provide security similar to (kdown + kup/2)-XOR Arbiter PUFs (CHES 2019). On the technical side, our novel divide-and-conquer technique might also be useful in analyzing other designs, where XOR Arbiter PUF challenge bits are unknown to the attacker.
The Interpose PUF: Secure PUF Design against State-of-the-art Machine Learning Attacks 📺
The design of a silicon Strong Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) that is lightweight and stable, and which possesses a rigorous security argument, has been a fundamental problem in PUF research since its very beginnings in 2002. Various effective PUF modeling attacks, for example at CCS 2010 and CHES 2015, have shown that currently, no existing silicon PUF design can meet these requirements. In this paper, we introduce the novel Interpose PUF (iPUF) design, and rigorously prove its security against all known machine learning (ML) attacks, including any currently known reliability-based strategies that exploit the stability of single CRPs (we are the first to provide a detailed analysis of when the reliability based CMA-ES attack is successful and when it is not applicable). Furthermore, we provide simulations and confirm these in experiments with FPGA implementations of the iPUF, demonstrating its practicality. Our new iPUF architecture so solves the currently open problem of constructing practical, silicon Strong PUFs that are secure against state-of-the-art ML attacks.
FlipIt: The Game of “Stealthy Takeover”
Recent targeted attacks have increased significantly in sophistication, undermining the fundamental assumptions on which most cryptographic primitives rely for security. For instance, attackers launching an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) can steal full cryptographic keys, violating the very secrecy of “secret” keys that cryptographers assume in designing secure protocols. In this article, we introduce a game-theoretic framework for modeling various computer security scenarios prevalent today, including targeted attacks. We are particularly interested in situations in which an attacker periodically compromises a system or critical resource completely, learns all its secret information and is not immediately detected by the system owner or defender. We propose a two-player game between an attacker and defender called FlipIt or The Game of “Stealthy Takeover.” In FlipIt, players compete to control a shared resource. Unlike most existing games, FlipIt allows players to move at any given time, taking control of the resource. The identity of the player controlling the resource, however, is not revealed until a player actually moves. To move, a player pays a certain move cost. The objective of each player is to control the resource a large fraction of time, while minimizing his total move cost. FlipIt provides a simple and elegant framework in which we can formally reason about the interaction between attackers and defenders in practical scenarios. In this article, we restrict ourselves to games in which one of the players (the defender) plays with a renewal strategy, one in which the intervals between consecutive moves are chosen independently and uniformly at random from a fixed probability distribution. We consider attacker strategies ranging in increasing sophistication from simple periodic strategies (with moves spaced at equal time intervals) to more complex adaptive strategies, in which moves are determined based on feedback received during the game. For different classes of strategies employed by the attacker, we determine strongly dominant strategies for both players (when they exist), strategies that achieve higher benefit than all other strategies in a particular class. When strongly dominant strategies do not exist, our goal is to characterize the residual game consisting of strategies that are not strongly dominated by other strategies. We also prove equivalence or strict inclusion of certain classes of strategies under different conditions. Our analysis of different FlipIt variants teaches cryptographers, system designers, and the community at large some valuable lessons: 1.Systems should be designed under the assumption of repeated total compromise, including theft of cryptographic keys. FlipIt provides guidance on how to implement a cost-effective defensive strategy.2.Aggressive play by one player can motivate the opponent to drop out of the game (essentially not to play at all). Therefore, moving fast is a good defensive strategy, but it can only be implemented if move costs are low. We believe that virtualization has a huge potential in this respect.3.Close monitoring of one’s resources is beneficial in detecting potential attacks faster, gaining insight into attacker’s strategies, and scheduling defensive moves more effectively. Interestingly, FlipIt finds applications in other security realms besides modeling of targeted attacks. Examples include cryptographic key rotation, password changing policies, refreshing virtual machines, and cloud auditing.

Program Committees

Crypto 2016
Eurocrypt 2015
Crypto 2011