International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Manuel Barbosa


Provable Security Analysis of FIDO2 📺
We carry out the first provable security analysis of the new FIDO2 protocols, the promising FIDO Alliance’s proposal for a standard for passwordless user authentication. Our analysis covers the core components of FIDO2: the W3C’s Web Authentication (WebAuthn) specification and the new Client-to-Authenticator Protocol (CTAP2). Our analysis is modular. For WebAuthn and CTAP2, in turn, we propose appropriate security models that aim to capture their intended security goals and use the models to analyze their security. First, our proof confirms the authentication security of WebAuthn. Then, we show CTAP2 can only be proved secure in a weak sense; meanwhile, we identify a series of its design flaws and provide suggestions for improvement. To withstand stronger yet realistic adversaries, we propose a generic protocol called sPACA and prove its strong security; with proper instantiations, sPACA is also more efficient than CTAP2. Finally, we analyze the overall security guarantees provided by FIDO2 and WebAuthn+sPACA based on the security of their components. We expect that our models and provable security results will help clarify the security guarantees of the FIDO2 protocols. In addition, we advocate the adoption of our sPACA protocol as a substitute for CTAP2 for both stronger security and better performance.
Algebraic Adversaries in the Universal Composability Framework 📺
The algebraic-group model (AGM), which lies between the generic group model and the standard model of computation, provides a means by which to analyze the security of cryptosystems against so-called algebraic adversaries. We formalize the AGM within the framework of universal composability, providing formal definitions for this setting and proving an appropriate composition theorem. This extends the applicability of the AGM to more-complex protocols, and lays the foundations for analyzing algebraic adversaries in a composable fashion. Our results also clarify the meaning of composing proofs in the AGM with other proofs and they highlight a natural form of independence between idealized groups that seems inherent to the AGM and has not been made formal before---these insights also apply to the composition of game-based proofs in the AGM. We show the utility of our model by proving several important protocols universally composable for algebraic adversaries, specifically: (1) the Chou-Orlandi protocol for oblivious transfer, and (2) the SPAKE2 and CPace protocols for password-based authenticated key exchange.
Universally Composable Relaxed Password Authenticated Key Exchange 📺
Protocols for password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) allow two parties who share only a weak password to agree on a cryptographic key. We revisit the notion of PAKE in the universal composability (UC) framework, and propose a relaxation of the PAKE functionality of Canetti et al. that we call lazy-extraction PAKE (lePAKE). Our relaxation allows the ideal-world adversary to postpone its password guess until after a session is complete. We argue that this relaxed notion still provides meaningful security in the password-only setting. As our main result, we show that several PAKE protocols that were previously only proven secure with respect to a ``game-based'' definition of security can be shown to UC-realize the lePAKE functionality in the random-oracle model. These include SPEKE, SPAKE2, and TBPEKE, the most efficient PAKE schemes currently known.
Indifferentiable Authenticated Encryption 📺
Manuel Barbosa Pooya Farshim
We study Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) from the viewpoint of composition in arbitrary (single-stage) environments. We use the indifferentiability framework to formalize the intuition that a “good” AEAD scheme should have random ciphertexts subject to decryptability. Within this framework, we can then apply the indifferentiability composition theorem to show that such schemes offer extra safeguards wherever the relevant security properties are not known, or cannot be predicted in advance, as in general-purpose crypto libraries and standards.We show, on the negative side, that generic composition (in many of its configurations) and well-known classical and recent schemes fail to achieve indifferentiability. On the positive side, we give a provably indifferentiable Feistel-based construction, which reduces the round complexity from at least 6, needed for blockciphers, to only 3 for encryption. This result is not too far off the theoretical optimum as we give a lower bound that rules out the indifferentiability of any construction with less than 2 rounds.

Program Committees

Crypto 2019