International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research

CryptoDB

Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky

Publications

Year
Venue
Title
2021
EUROCRYPT
Leakage-resilience of the Shamir Secret-sharing Scheme against Physical-bit Leakages 📺
Efficient Reed-Solomon code reconstruction algorithms, for example, by Guruswami and Wooters (STOC--2016), translate into local leakage attacks on Shamir secret-sharing schemes over characteristic-2 fields. However, Benhamouda, Degwekar, Ishai, and Rabin (CRYPTO--2018) showed that the Shamir secret sharing scheme over prime-fields is leakage resilient to one-bit local leakage if the reconstruction threshold is roughly 0.87 times the total number of parties. In several application scenarios, like secure multi-party multiplication, the reconstruction threshold must be at most half the number of parties. Furthermore, the number of leakage bits that the Shamir secret sharing scheme is resilient to is also unclear. Towards this objective, we study the Shamir secret-sharing scheme's leakage-resilience over a prime-field $F$. The parties' secret-shares, which are elements in the finite field $F$, are naturally represented as $\lambda$-bit binary strings representing the elements $\{0,1,\dotsc,p-1\}$. In our leakage model, the adversary can independently probe $m$ bit-locations from each secret share. The inspiration for considering this leakage model stems from the impact that the study of oblivious transfer combiners had on general correlation extraction algorithms, and the significant influence of protecting circuits from probing attacks has on leakage-resilient secure computation. Consider arbitrary reconstruction threshold $k\geq 2$, physical bit-leakage parameter $m\geq 1$, and the number of parties $n\geq 1$. We prove that Shamir's secret-sharing scheme with random evaluation places is leakage-resilient with high probability when the order of the field $F$ is sufficiently large; ignoring polylogarithmic factors, one needs to ensure that $\log \abs F \geq n/k$. Our result, excluding polylogarithmic factors, states that Shamir's scheme is secure as long as the total amount of leakage $m\cdot n$ is less than the entropy $k\cdot\lambda$ introduced by the Shamir secret-sharing scheme. Note that our result holds even for small constant values of the reconstruction threshold $k$, which is essential to several application scenarios. To complement this positive result, we present a physical-bit leakage attack for $m=1$ physical bit-leakage from $n=k$ secret shares and any prime-field $F$ satisfying $\abs F=1\mod k$. In particular, there are (roughly) $\abs F^{n-k+1}$ such vulnerable choices for the $n$-tuple of evaluation places. We lower-bound the advantage of this attack for small values of the reconstruction threshold, like $k=2$ and $k=3$, and any $\abs F=1\mod k$. In general, we present a formula calculating our attack's advantage for every $k$ as $\abs F\rightarrow\infty.$ Technically, our positive result relies on Fourier analysis, analytic properties of proper rank-$r$ generalized arithmetic progressions, and B\'ezout's theorem to bound the number of solutions to an equation over finite fields. The analysis of our attack relies on determining the ``discrepancy'' of the Irwin-Hall distribution. A probability distribution's discrepancy is a new property of distributions that our work introduces, which is of potential independent interest.
2021
CRYPTO
Constructing Locally Leakage-resilient Linear Secret-sharing Schemes 📺
Hemanta K. Maji Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky Tom Suad Mingyuan Wang
Innovative side-channel attacks have repeatedly falsified the assumption that cryptographic implementations are opaque black-boxes. Therefore, it is essential to ensure cryptographic constructions' security even when information leaks via unforeseen avenues. One such fundamental cryptographic primitive is the secret-sharing schemes, which underlies nearly all threshold cryptography. Our understanding of the leakage-resilience of secret-sharing schemes is still in its preliminary stage. This work studies locally leakage-resilient linear secret-sharing schemes. An adversary can leak $m$ bits of arbitrary local leakage from each $n$ secret shares. However, in a locally leakage-resilient secret-sharing scheme, the leakage's joint distribution reveals no additional information about the secret. For every constant $m$, we prove that the Massey secret-sharing scheme corresponding to a random linear code of dimension $k$ (over sufficiently large prime fields) is locally leakage-resilient, where $k/n > 1/2$ is a constant. The previous best construction by Benhamouda, Degwekar, Ishai, Rabin (CRYPTO--2018) needed $k/n > 0.907$. A technical challenge arises because the number of all possible $m$-bit local leakage functions is exponentially larger than the number of random linear codes. Our technical innovation begins with identifying an appropriate pseudorandomness-inspired family of tests; passing them suffices to ensure leakage-resilience. We show that most linear codes pass all tests in this family. This Monte-Carlo construction of linear secret-sharing scheme that is locally leakage-resilient has applications to leakage-resilient secure computation. Furthermore, we highlight a crucial bottleneck for all the analytical approaches in this line of work. Benhamouda et al. introduced an analytical proxy to study the leakage-resilience of secret-sharing schemes; if the proxy is small, then the scheme is leakage-resilient. However, we present a one-bit local leakage function demonstrating that the converse is false, motivating the need for new analytically well-behaved functions that capture leakage-resilience more accurately. Technically, the analysis involves probabilistic and combinatorial techniques and (discrete) Fourier analysis. The family of new ``tests'' capturing local leakage functions, we believe, is of independent and broader interest.
2020
CRYPTO
MPC with Friends and Foes 📺
Bar Alon Omri Eran Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky
Classical definitions for secure multiparty computation assume the existence of a single adversarial entity controlling the set of corrupted parties. Intuitively, the definition requires that the view of the adversary, corrupting t parties, in a real-world execution can be simulated by an adversary in an ideal model, where parties interact only via a trusted-party. No restrictions, however, are imposed on the view of honest parties in the protocol, thus, if honest parties obtain information about the private inputs of other honest parties -- it is not counted as a violation of privacy. This is arguably undesirable in many situations that fall into the MPC framework. Nevertheless, there are secure protocols (e.g., the 2-round multiparty protocol of Ishai et al. [CRYPTO 2010] tolerating a single corrupted party) that instruct the honest parties to reveal their private inputs to all other honest parties (once the malicious party is somehow identified). In this paper, we put forth a new security notion, which we call FaF-security, extending the classical notion. In essence, (t,h^*)-FaF-security requires the view of a subset of up to h^* honest parties to also be simulatable in the ideal model (in addition to the view of the malicious adversary, corrupting up to t parties). This property should still hold, even if the adversary leaks information to honest parties by sending them non-prescribed messages. We provide a thorough exploration of the new notion, investigating it in relation to a variety of existing security notions. We further investigate the feasibility of achieving FaF-security and show that every functionality can be computed with (computational) (t,h^*)-FaF full-security, if and only if 2t+ h^*<m. Interestingly, the lower-bound result actually shows that even fair FaF-security is impossible in general when 2t+ h^*\ge m (surprisingly, the view of the malicious attacker is not used as the trigger for the attack). We also investigate the optimal round complexity for (t,h^*)-Faf-secure protocols and give evidence that the leakage of private inputs of honest parties in the protocol of Ishai et al. [CRYPTO 2010] is inherent.
2019
TCC
On Perfectly Secure 2PC in the OT-Hybrid Model
Bar Alon Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky
A well known result by Kilian [22] (ACM 1988) asserts that general secure two computation (2PC) with statistical security, can be based on OT. Specifically, in the client-server model, where only one party – the client – receives an output, Kilian’s result shows that given the ability to call an ideal oracle that computes OT, two parties can securely compute an arbitrary function of their inputs with unconditional security. Ishai et al. [19] (EUROCRYPT 2011) further showed that this can be done efficiently for every two-party functionality in $$\mathrm {NC}^1$$ in a single round.However, their results only achieve statistical security, namely, it is allowed to have some error in security. This leaves open the natural question as to which client-server functionalities can be computed with perfect security in the OT-hybrid model, and what is the round complexity of such computation. So far, only a handful of functionalities were known to have such protocols. In addition to the obvious theoretical appeal of the question towards better understanding secure computation, perfect, as opposed to statistical reductions, may be useful for designing secure multiparty protocols with high concrete efficiency, achieved by eliminating the dependence on a security parameter.In this work, we identify a large class of client-server functionalities $$f:\mathcal {X}\times \mathcal {Y}\mapsto \{0,1\}$$, where the server’s domain $$\mathcal {X}$$ is larger than the client’s domain $$\mathcal {Y}$$, that have a perfect reduction to OT. Furthermore, our reduction is 1-round using an oracle to secure evaluation of many parallel invocations of $$\left( {\begin{array}{c}2\\ 1\end{array}}\right) \text {-bit-OT}$$, as done by Ishai et al. [19] (EUROCRYPT 2011). Interestingly, the set of functions that we are able to compute was previously identified by Asharov [2] (TCC 2014) in the context of fairness in two-party computation, naming these functions full-dimensional. Our result also extends to randomized non-Boolean functions $$f: \mathcal {X}\times \mathcal {Y}\mapsto \left\{ 0,\ldots ,k-1\right\} $$ satisfying $$|\mathcal {X}|>(k-1)\cdot |\mathcal {Y}|$$.
2019
TCC
Interactive Non-malleable Codes
Non-malleable codes (NMC) introduced by Dziembowski et al. [ICS’10] allow one to encode “passive” data in such a manner that when a codeword is tampered, the original data either remains completely intact or is essentially destroyed.In this work, we initiate the study of interactive non-malleable codes (INMCs) that allow for encoding “active communication” rather than passive data. An INMC allows two parties to engage in an interactive protocol such that an adversary who is able to tamper with the protocol messages either leaves the original transcript intact (i.e., the parties are able to reconstruct the original transcript) or the transcript is completely destroyed and replaced with an unrelated one.We formalize a tampering model for interactive protocols and put forward the notion of INMCs. Since constructing INMCs for general adversaries is impossible (as in the case of non-malleable codes), we construct INMCs for several specific classes of tampering functions. These include bounded state, split state, and fragmented sliding window tampering functions. We also obtain lower bounds for threshold tampering functions via a connection to interactive coding. All of our results are unconditional.
2017
TCC
2015
CRYPTO
2014
CRYPTO
2014
CRYPTO
2013
TCC

Program Committees

TCC 2020