International Association for Cryptologic Research

International Association
for Cryptologic Research


Paper: Fault-Injection Attacks against NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography Round 3 KEM Candidates

Keita Xagawa , NTT Social Informatics Laboratories
Akira Ito , Tohoku University
Rei Ueno , Tohoku University and PRESTO
Junko Takahashi , NTT Social Informatics Laboratories
Naofumi Homma , Tohoku University/CREST
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-92075-3_2
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Presentation: Slides
Conference: ASIACRYPT 2021
Abstract: We investigate __all__ NIST PQC Round 3 KEM candidates from the viewpoint of fault-injection attacks: Classic McEliece, Kyber, NTRU, Saber, BIKE, FrodoKEM, HQC, NTRU Prime, and SIKE. All KEM schemes use variants of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation, so the equality test with re-encryption in decapsulation is critical. We survey effective key-recovery attacks when we can skip the equality test. We found the existing key-recovery attacks against Kyber, NTRU, Saber, FrodoKEM, HQC, one of two KEM schemes in NTRU Prime, and SIKE. We propose a new key-recovery attack against the other KEM scheme in NTRU Prime. We also report an attack against BIKE that leads to leakage of information of secret keys. The open-source pqm4 library contains all KEM schemes except Classic McEliece and HQC. We show that giving a single instruction-skipping fault in the decapsulation processes leads to skipping the equality test __virtually__ for Kyber, NTRU, Saber, BIKE, and SIKE. We also report the experimental attacks against them. We also report the implementation of NTRU Prime allows chosen-ciphertext attacks freely and the timing side-channel of FrodoKEM reported in Guo, Johansson, and Nilsson (CRYPTO 2020) remains, while there are no such bugs in their NIST PQC Round 3 submissions.
Video from ASIACRYPT 2021
  title={Fault-Injection Attacks against NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography Round 3 KEM Candidates},
  author={Keita Xagawa and Akira Ito and Rei Ueno and Junko Takahashi and Naofumi Homma},