## CryptoDB

### Paper: Round-Optimal Secure Multi-party Computation

Authors: Shai Halevi Carmit Hazay Antigoni Polychroniadou Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam DOI: 10.1007/s00145-021-09382-3 Search ePrint Search Google Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a central cryptographic task that allows a set of mutually distrustful parties to jointly compute some function of their private inputs where security should hold in the presence of an active (i.e. malicious) adversary that can corrupt any number of parties. Despite extensive research, the precise round complexity of this “standard-bearer” cryptographic primitive, under polynomial-time hardness assumptions, is unknown. Recently, Garg, Mukherjee, Pandey and Polychroniadou, in Eurocrypt 2016 demonstrated that the round complexity of any MPC protocol relying on black-box proofs of security in the plain model must be at least four. Following this work, independently Ananth, Choudhuri and Jain, CRYPTO 2017 and Brakerski, Halevi, and Polychroniadou, TCC 2017 made progress towards solving this question and constructed four-round protocols based on the DDH and LWE assumptions, respectively, albeit with super-polynomial hardness. More recently, Ciampi, Ostrovsky, Siniscalchi and Visconti in TCC 2017 closed the gap for two-party protocols by constructing a four-round protocol from polynomial-time assumptions, concretely, trapdoor permutations. In another work, Ciampi, Ostrovsky, Siniscalchi and Visconti TCC 2017 showed how to design a four-round multi-party protocol for the specific case of multi-party coin-tossing based on one-way functions. In this work, we resolve this question by designing a four-round actively secure multi-party (two or more parties) protocol for general functionalities under standard polynomial-time hardness assumptions with a black-box proof of security, specifically, under the assumptions LWE, DDH, QR and DCR.
##### BibTeX
@article{jofc-2021-31774,
title={Round-Optimal Secure Multi-party Computation},
journal={Journal of Cryptology},
publisher={Springer},
volume={34},
doi={10.1007/s00145-021-09382-3},
author={Shai Halevi and Carmit Hazay and Antigoni Polychroniadou and Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam},
year=2021
}