Paper 2002/188

Key recovery attacks on NTRU without ciphertext validation routine

Daewan Han, Jin Hong, Jae Woo Han, and Daesung Kwon

Abstract

NTRU is an efficient public-key cryptosystem proposed by Hoffstein, Pipher, and Silverman. Assuming access to a decryption oracle, we show ways to recover the private key of NTRU systems that do not include a ciphertext validating procedure. The strongest of our methods will employ just a single call to the oracle, and in all cases, the number of calls needed will be small enough to be realistic.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
cryptanalysisNTRUchosen-ciphertext attack
Contact author(s)
jinhong @ bigfoot com
History
2003-04-19: revised
2002-12-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2002/188
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2002/188,
      author = {Daewan Han and Jin Hong and Jae Woo Han and Daesung Kwon},
      title = {Key recovery attacks on NTRU without ciphertext validation routine},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2002/188},
      year = {2002},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/188}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2002/188}
}
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