Paper 2004/083

Scan Based Side Channel Attack on Data Encryption Standard

Bo Yang, Kaijie Wu, and Ramesh Karri

Abstract

Scan based test is a double edged sword. On one hand, it is a powerful test technique. On the other hand, it is an equally powerful attack tool. In this paper we show that scan chains can be used as a side channel to recover secret keys from a hardware implementation of the Data Encryption Standard (DES). By loading pairs of known plaintexts with one-bit difference in the normal mode and then scanning out the internal state in the test mode, we first determine the position of all scan elements in the scan chain. Then, based on a systematic analysis of the structure of the non-linear substitution boxes, and using three additional plaintexts we discover the DES secret key. Finally, some assumptions in the attack are discussed.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
DESscan based test
Contact author(s)
yangbo @ photon poly edu
History
2004-03-28: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2004/083
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/083,
      author = {Bo Yang and Kaijie Wu and Ramesh Karri},
      title = {Scan Based Side Channel Attack on Data Encryption Standard},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2004/083},
      year = {2004},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/083}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/083}
}
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