Paper 2004/283
Fault and Side-Channel Attacks on Pairing Based Cryptography
D. Page and F. Vercauteren
Abstract
Current side-channel analytic attacks against public key cryptography focus on traditional schemes such as RSA and ECC, and to a lesser extent primitives such as XTR. However, bilinear maps, or pairings, have presented theorists with a new and increasingly popular way of constructing cryptographic protocols. Most notably, this has resulted in efficient methods for Identity Based Encryption (IBE). Since identity based cryptography seems an ideal partner for identity aware devices such as smart-cards, in this paper we examine the security of concrete pairing instantiations in terms of side-channel analysis.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- pairingsside channel analysis
- Contact author(s)
- page @ cs bris ac uk
- History
- 2004-11-03: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/283
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/283,
author = {D. Page and F. Vercauteren},
title = {Fault and Side-Channel Attacks on Pairing Based Cryptography},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2004/283},
year = {2004},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/283}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/283}
}
