Paper 2005/451

Weaknesses of the Boyd-Mao Deniable Authenticated key Establishment for Internet Protocols

Jue-Sam Chou, Yalin Chen, and Ming-De Yang

Abstract

In 2003, Boyd and Mao proposed two deniable authenticated key establishment protocols using elliptic curve pairings for Internet protocols, one is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the other is based on Public-Key Encryption approach. For the use of elliptic curve pairings, they declared that their schemes could be more efficient than the existing Internet Key Exchange (IKE), nowadays. However in this paper, we will show that both of Boyd-Mao¡¦s protocols suffer from the key-Compromise Impersonation attack.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. not be duplicates of work published previously or scheduled to be published
Keywords
deniable authenticated key establishmentInternet Key Exchange (IKE)key-Compromise Impersonation attackelliptic curve cryptosystem
Contact author(s)
jschou @ mail nhu edu tw
History
2005-12-14: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2005/451
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/451,
      author = {Jue-Sam Chou and Yalin Chen and Ming-De Yang},
      title = {Weaknesses of the Boyd-Mao Deniable Authenticated key Establishment for Internet Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2005/451},
      year = {2005},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/451}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/451}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.