eprint.iacr.org will be offline for approximately an hour
for routine maintenance at 11pm UTC on Tuesday, April 16. We lost some data between
April 12 and April 14, and some authors have been notified that they need to resubmit their papers.
Paper 2007/480
Differential Fault Analysis on the AES Key Schedule
Junko Takahashi and Toshinori Fukunaga
Abstract
This letter proposes a differential fault analysis on the AES key schedule and shows how an entire 128-bit AES key can be retrieved. In the workshop at FDTC 2007, we presented the DFA mechanism on the AES key schedule and proposed general attack rules. Using our proposed rules, we showed an efficient attack that can retrieve 80 bits of the 128-bit key. Recently, we have found a new attack that can obtain an additional 8 bits compared with our previous attack. As a result, we present most efficient attack for retrieving 88 bits of the 128-bit key using approximately two pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- DFAAESSide Channel Analysis
- Contact author(s)
- takahashi junko @ lab ntt co jp
- History
- 2007-12-28: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2007/480
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/480,
author = {Junko Takahashi and Toshinori Fukunaga},
title = {Differential Fault Analysis on the AES Key Schedule},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2007/480},
year = {2007},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/480}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/480}
}
