Paper 2008/477

On a New Formal Proof Model for RFID Location Privacy (Extended Version)

Ton van Deursen and Sasa Radomirovic

Abstract

We discuss a recently proposed formal proof model for RFID location privacy. We show that protocols which intuitively and in several other models are considered not to be location private, are provably location private in this model. Conversely, we also show that protocols which obviously are location private, are not considered location private in this model. Specifically, we prove a protocol in which every tag transmits the same constant message to not be location private in the proposed model. Then we prove a protocol in which a tag’s identity is transmitted in clear text to be weakly location private in the model. Finally, we consider a protocol with known weaknesses with respect to location privacy and show it to be location private in the model.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. An abridged version appeared in Information Processing Letters 110(2) (2009), pages 57–61.
Keywords
Location privacyuntraceabilityRFID
Contact author(s)
sasa radomirovic @ uni lu
History
2009-12-07: revised
2008-11-18: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/477
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/477,
      author = {Ton van Deursen and Sasa Radomirovic},
      title = {On a New Formal Proof Model for RFID Location Privacy (Extended Version)},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2008/477},
      year = {2008},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/477}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/477}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.