Paper 2009/504

Insecure ``Provable Secure Network Coding''

Yongge Wang

Abstract

Network coding allows the routers to mix the received information before forwarding them to the next nodes. Though this information mixing has been proven to maximize network throughput, it also introduces security challenges such as pollution attacks. A malicious node could insert a malicious packet into the system and this corrupted packet will propagate more quickly than in traditional copy-and-forward networks. Several authors have studied secure network coding from both information theoretic and probabilistic viewpoints. In this paper, we show that there are serious flaws in several of these schemes (the security ``proofs'' for these schemes were presented in these publications).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. submitted to some journals
Contact author(s)
yonwang @ uncc edu
History
2009-10-20: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/504
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/504,
      author = {Yongge Wang},
      title = {Insecure ``Provable Secure Network Coding''},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2009/504},
      year = {2009},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/504}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/504}
}
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