Paper 2010/552

A Note on Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge and the ZKPOK Ideal Functionality

Carmit Hazay and Yehuda Lindell

Abstract

In this note, we provide a formal proof of the fact that any protocol that is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for a relation $R$ is also a secure protocol for the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge functionality, where the latter is defined according to the standard framework of stand-alone secure computation. Although this is a well-known fact, to the best of our knowledge, no full proof of this has been published.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. This is an excerpt from the book "Efficent Secure Two-Party Protocols" by the authors.
Contact author(s)
lindell @ cs biu ac il
History
2010-11-01: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/552
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/552,
      author = {Carmit Hazay and Yehuda Lindell},
      title = {A Note on Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge and the ZKPOK Ideal Functionality},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/552},
      year = {2010},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/552}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/552}
}
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